



INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
DEPARTMENT OF NORWEGIAN
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

SSA-O

Appendix 1: The Customer's specification of the Assignment

Reference: 26/00338

Contents:

Appendix 1: The Customer's specification of the Assignment	2
Section 1.1 Scope of the Agreement	2
1. Background	2
2. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation	14
3. Scope of the Evaluation	15
4. Audience of the Evaluation.....	16
5. Evaluation Questions	17
6. Methodology.....	18
Additional References.....	21
Section 5.1.1 The Consultant's responsibilities and expertise.....	22
8. Deliverables.....	22
9. Bid Selection Criteria	25
Section 7.1 Information security	26
Section 7.2.2 Other obligations relating to the processing of personal data	26

Appendix 1: The Customer's specification of the Assignment

This appendix must be completed by the Customer. The following sections reference provisions in the Agreement and serve as a reminder for the Customer to consider these sections.

Section 1.1 Scope of the Agreement

1. Background

Four years into Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine faces a convergence of crises: shattered infrastructure, repeated humanitarian emergencies, and growing strain on the state's ability to protect civilians and sustain essential functions¹. The **Nansen Support Program for Ukraine** represents the largest international aid initiative in Norway's modern history. Launched in February

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2026). *Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 (January 2026)*. Available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2026-january-2026-enuk>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

2023 with an initial allocation of NOK 75 billion over five years, the Program was substantially expanded in December 2025 to NOK 274,5 billion and extended through 2030. The Program encompasses both military and civilian components.²

Covering 17.6% of the 2026 allocation of NOK 85 billion³, civilian support under the Nansen Program addresses both urgent needs and medium- to longer-term resilience requirements. Most of the funds flow through established multilateral institutions and trusted partners⁴ - including the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), UN agencies, and Norwegian non-governmental organizations. Enabling annual allocation adjustments in response to evolving conditions, all assistance is flexible and subject to requirements for transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption.⁵

As the war enters its fifth year, rigorous assessment of the civilian component becomes both urgent and strategically important with attention moving from early recovery toward reconstruction.⁶ In this context, energy is a central sector of support, sustaining populations and livelihoods during acute crises. Consistent with Norway's Humanitarian Strategy (2024-2027)⁷, energy is a priority area in which Norway has made substantial and sustained contributions. Norway's approach in Ukraine is twofold: sustaining critical services under acute system stress while also contributing to longer-term efforts to modernize the energy system in line with a sustainable transition model.

For this evaluation, *energy security* is defined as the ability of Ukraine's and Moldova's energy systems to keep essential services functional, while managing disruptions to supply, infrastructure, affordability, and political or economic stability⁸. *Energy resilience* refers to the capacity of energy systems to anticipate disruptions, maintain critical performance despite shocks, evolve in response to gradual changes in physical conditions, and restore services rapidly after interruption⁹. In practice, this means designing systems that can respond quickly under uncertainty, contain affected elements, and restore essential services as fast as possible¹⁰.

² Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2026). *Norwegian support to Ukraine and neighboring countries*. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/humanitarian-efforts/neighbor_support/id2908141/. Accessed 11 June 2026.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). *Proposition to the Storting (proposal for a Storting resolution) 44S*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-44-s-20222023/id2963549/>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024). *Report to the Storting 8 (2023–2024): The Nansen Program for Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-8-20232024/id3023633/>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2023). *Proposition to the Storting 44 S (2022–2023), Section: Support to Moldova and global ripple effects*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/prop.-44-s-20222023/id2963549/>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

³ Government of Norway. (2026). *Slik fordeles de sivile Nansen-midlene for 2026*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/slik-fordeles-de-sivile-nansen-midlene-for-2026/id3145799/>. Accessed 21 May 2026.

⁴ Department for Evaluation. (2024) *Assessment of Nansen Department's current system and practices for tracking, analysing and following up on results*. Norad. Available from: https://www.norec.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/7_2024_Assessment-of-Nansen-Department-current-systems-and-practices-for-results-management.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2026.

⁵ Norad (2024). *Norwegian Support to Ukraine and Neighbouring Countries*. Available from: <https://www.norad.no/en/insight2/tematiske-omrader/the-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine/areas-of-norwegian-support-to-ukraine-and-neighbouring-countries/>. Accessed 6 May 2026.

⁶ Norad. (2025). *Norad increases support for reconstruction efforts in Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-increases-support-for-reconstruction-efforts-in-ukraine/id3098032/>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

⁷ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024) *Norway's Humanitarian Strategy. 2024 – 2027*. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7257c8ae2e1f47e9a44c93844b6a8864/en-gb/pdfs/e-1026-e_norways-humanitarian-strategy.pdf. Accessed 18 May 2026.

⁸ International Energy Agency. (2011). *The IEA model of short-term energy security (MOSES): Primary energy sources and secondary fuels*. OECD/IEA. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-iea-model-of-short-term-energy-security-moses_5k9h0wd2ghlv-en.html. Accessed 12 June 2026.

⁹ International Energy Agency. (2026). *Energy system resilience: Lessons learned from Ukraine*. IEA. Available from: <https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-system-resilience>. Accessed 12 June 2026.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Rationale for the Evaluation

The scale of the Nansen Program, the diverse instruments deployed, the fast decision cycles, the shifting war dynamics, evolving demographic and vulnerability patterns, and the stakes involved all point toward the strategic importance of systematic evaluation at this juncture. A previous evaluation of the Nansen Support Program examined how results are managed and how learning is supported¹¹. Recent findings from the Office of the Auditor General of Norway suggest that Norway's support to Ukraine has broadly met its overarching purpose by responding to Ukrainian needs and being delivered quickly. However, important weaknesses remain in risk assessment, information sharing, and documentation of control arrangements¹². Attention now turns to evaluating how civilian interventions have shaped broader systemic outcomes within a protracted conflict context. This evaluation focuses on outcomes and impacts in the energy sector, assessing the causal logic linking energy support to wider civilian outcomes within the Nansen Program Theory of Change, contribution pathways, cross-sector interactions, unintended effects, and the conditions under which different approaches may be sustained or expanded. Understanding how energy investments translate into broader resilience outcomes, and how they interact with Norwegian donor mechanisms and other portfolio elements, is essential for prioritization and resource allocation. The evaluation will cover the civilian component of the Nansen Support Program from its inception in February 2023 through July 2026.

The evaluation is timely, reflecting strategic priorities emerging from both the Program's operational experience and current knowledge gaps. Energy infrastructure represents Norway's largest single sectoral investment in Ukraine and functions as a foundational enabler of all other outcomes: humanitarian protection, economic recovery, governance reform, and social cohesion. Against this backdrop, renewable energy within the broader energy mix is also relevant because it can strengthen resilience through more secure domestic supply, energy independence, and lower exposure to external price volatility¹³. Moldova offers a relevant comparative perspective because it faces related energy-security challenges, remains closely linked to Ukraine's energy system, and receives Norwegian support for green transition efforts, albeit under fundamentally different conditions from those of a country at war.

¹¹ Department for Evaluation. (2024). *Assessment of Nansen Department's current system and practices for tracking, analysing and following up on results*. Norad. Available from: https://www.norec.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/7_2024_Assessment-of-Nansen-Department-current-systems-and-practices-for-results-management.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2026.

Department for Evaluation. (2024). *Recommendations for improvement in systems and practices for Nansen Programme results management*. Norad. Available from: https://www.norec.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/8_2024_Recommendations-for-improvement-in-systems-and-practices-for-Nansen-Programme-results-management-1.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2026.

Department for Evaluation. (2024). *Rapid comparative review of results management principles and 'best-fit' approaches for Ukraine programming*. Norad. Available from: https://www.norec.no/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/6_2024_Rapid-comparative-review-of-results-management-principles-%E2%80%98best-fit-approaches-for-Ukraine-programming.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2026.

¹² Riksrevisjonen. (2026). *Overordnede formål med Ukraina-støtten oppfylt*. Available from: <https://www.riksrevisjonen.no/rapporter-mappe/no-2025-2026/formalet-med-ukraina-stotten-oppfylt/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

¹³ European Commission. Energy, climate, environment. (2026). *Recovery and resilience facility for clean energy - European Commission*. Available from: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/funding-and-financing/recovery-and-resilience-facility-clean-energy_en#national-recovery-and-resilience-plans-2026. Accessed 21 May 2026.

Stockholm Environment Institute. (2026). *Europe's green transition is now a matter of energy security*. Available from:

<https://www.sei.org/perspectives/europes-green-transition-is-now-a-matter-of-energy-security/>. Accessed 21 May 2026.

Eurelectric. (2026). *Repowering Europe & Delivering Clean Energy Resilience – Manifesto for the 2024-2029*. Available from: <https://www.eurelectric.org/publications/repowering-europe-delivering-clean-energy-resilience-manifesto-for-the-2024-2029/>. Accessed 21 May 2026.

Luber, M. (2026). *2026 Outlook: Clean Energy, Nature, And Water Drive Global Resilience*. Available from:

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/mindylubber/2026/01/12/2026-outlook-clean-energy-nature-and-water-drive-global-resilience/>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

Context of the Evaluation: Energy Needs and Support in Ukraine

Russia's deliberate targeting of Ukraine's power generation, transmission, and distribution systems has destroyed up to 70% of the country's generating capacity as of February 2026¹⁴. This creates a dual challenge: Ukraine is not only becoming increasingly energy deficient but must simultaneously rebuild and expand its energy system in line with decarbonization goals, often under repeated cycles of destruction and repair, requiring a pace of transition that exceeds typical European trajectories¹⁵. In practice, resilience is closely tied to heating continuity, since heating facilities require electricity to operate: power disruptions can translate quickly into acute humanitarian consequences in winter conditions. Neighboring Moldova has also witnessed dire effects: as a highly energy-constrained system¹⁶, it is now characterized by near total dependence on imported fossil fuels¹⁷, deep operational interconnection with Ukraine's electricity grid¹⁸, and recurrent exposure to power cuts and price shocks¹⁹. This has forced the system in both countries into a chronic deficit, particularly during winter months²⁰, with energy demand, supply constraints, and overall system functioning increasingly shaped by hybrid configurations combining fossil-based and renewable sources. The general shift towards more decentralized and renewable energy solutions in Ukraine also reflects system resilience considerations. Compared to large, centralized generation assets, smaller-scale and distributed green energy infrastructure may be less vulnerable to targeted attacks and faster to restore²¹, which has implications for energy security in an active conflict setting. At the same time, variable renewable generation alone cannot reliably meet peak demand without adequately balancing resources such as storage or dispatchable generation, which remains a critical limitation in the current system.

A central challenge in Ukraine's power system is the limited availability of flexible generation to meet peak demand. While baseload supply, particularly from nuclear energy, remains relatively stable, the system continues to face a balancing gap, most evident during morning and evening peaks and in winter. Addressing this requires capacity that can be dispatched rapidly, which has in turn shaped current investments towards gas-based capacity and, increasingly, battery storage. In this context, gas-based capacity is widely seen as a transitional solution, providing the flexibility needed to

¹⁴ Reuters. (2026). *Ukraine needs energy ceasefire as catastrophe looming, top power executive says*. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-needs-energy-ceasefire-catastrophe-looming-top-power-executive-says-2026-01-23/>. Accessed 12 June 2026.

Chatham House. (2026). *Russia's Attacks on Ukraine's Energy System. What are the consequences and how should Europe respond?* Online event. Available from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/standard-event-research-event/russias-attacks-ukraines-energy-system>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

¹⁵ Dixigroup. (2025). *Development of interconnected solutions, and equipment protection—key topics discussed at the Ukrainian Energy Security Dialogue 2025*. Available from: <https://dixigroup.org/en/development-of-interconnectors-green-solutions-and-equipment-protection-key-topics-discussed-at-the-ukrainian-energy-security-dialogue-2025/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

¹⁶ Ministry of Energy of Moldova. (2026). *Moldova continues to modernize its energy sector despite a tense regional context*. Available from: <https://energie.gov.md/en/content/moldova-continues-modernize-its-energy-sector-despite-tense-regional-context>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

¹⁷ International Energy Agency (IEA). (2026). *Moldova*. Available from: <https://www.iea.org/countries/moldova/energy-mix>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

¹⁸ Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Moldova. (2026). *The Republic of Moldova becomes a regional energy hub and supports Ukraine's reconstruction*. Available from: https://fredskorpset.sharepoint.com/w:/r/sites/EvaluationDepartment/_layouts/15/Doc.aspx?sourcedoc=%7Baac6447b-176d-4a82-a479-69eed5f42612%7D&action=edit&wdPid=5872cdf7. Accessed 5 May 2026.

¹⁹ Hedenskog, J. (2025). *Untangling the Moldovan energy crisis*. Available from: <https://sceeus.se/en/publications/untangling-the-moldovan-energy-crisis/>. Accessed 5 May 2026.


²⁰ World Bank. (2026). *Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released*. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/02/23/updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

²¹ International Energy Agency. (2024). *Empowering Ukraine through a Decentralized Electricity System*. Available from: <https://www.iea.org/reports/empowering-ukraine-through-a-decentralised-electricity-system>. Accessed 22 May 2026.

stabilize supply and sustain critical services, especially during winter, while renewable energy and storage are gradually scaled up.²²

Between 2022 and 2026, Norwegian planned allocations are projected to total NOK 52.3 billion and to be distributed almost equally across three main recipient sectors: energy, humanitarian aid, and budget support. The remaining tenth is intended to be allocated relatively evenly to the private sector; governance, democracy and reform; and support for Moldova²³.

The **energy sector** accounts for **nearly one third** of the Nansen Program 2022 – 2026 portfolio allocations.



Within this timeframe, Norway allocated NOK 16.5 billion to Ukraine's energy sector²⁴. Norwegian energy support spans a wide portfolio across Ukraine and Moldova and accounts for 31.5% of the Nansen Program's allocated budget through 2026²⁵. It includes: gas purchases to secure electricity and heating, managed through the EU's Ukraine Investment Framework²⁶ (launched in 2024²⁷) and EBRD; energy infrastructure repairs via the Energy Community and EBRD; decentralized power production in collaboration with

UNDP, EBRD, and the International Finance Corporation²⁸; and energy-efficiency measures via the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (Nefco) and EBRD²⁹. Norway's support to Ukraine's green energy transition reflects a dual objective of addressing immediate restoration needs while supporting longer-term transformation of the energy system. Key interventions include a three-year NOK 2 billion agreement with UNDP to strengthen decentralized power production and energy-sector modernization, and a three-year NOK 480 million agreement with Nefco to support green, energy-efficient local reconstruction³⁰. The portfolio approach links short-term recovery with longer-term resilience, energy efficiency, emissions reduction, and strengthened energy security.

²² UNDP Representative. Reference Group Interview. 22 May 2026.

²³ See reference 5, Norad (2024). *Norwegian Support to Ukraine and Neighbouring Countries*.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ EBRD. (2026). *Norway: EBRD Shareholder Profile*. Available from: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/who-we-are/our-organisation/shareholders/norway.html>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

²⁷ European Commission. (2026). *Ukraine Investment Framework*. Available from: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/ukraine/ukraine-investment-framework_en. Accessed 18 May 2026.

²⁸ Norwegian Government. (2026). *Nordic and Baltic countries working together to secure energy supplies for Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/nordic-and-baltic-countries-working-together-to-secure-energy-supplies-for-ukraine/id3150095/>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

²⁹ Ibid. See also Nefco. (2025). *Norway contributes an additional NOK 300 million to green reconstruction in Ukraine through Nefco*. Available from: <https://www.nefco.int/news/norway-contributes-an-additional-nok-300-million/>. Accessed 23 March 2026.

³⁰ Government of Norway. (2025). *Norway signs new agreement to strengthen Ukraine's energy security and green transition*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-signs-new-agreements-to-strengthen-ukraines-energy-security-and-green-transition/id3114730/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

Nefco. (2025). *Norway has pledged EUR 16 million for rebuilding activities in Ukraine through Nefco*. Available from: <https://www.nefco.int/news/norway-has-pledged-eur-16-million-for-rebuilding-activities-in-ukraine-through-nefco/>. Accessed 11 June 2026.

Sectoral energy breakdowns from Norad's website (as of 5 May 2026) are presented below. The figures represent total commitments under signed agreements, including multi-year allocations. They capture only part of Norway's overall energy support, as a substantial share is channeled through other mechanisms, such as unearmarked multi-donor contributions (e.g. to the World Bank's Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund³¹) and multilateral financing instruments, not systematically reflected in sectoral reporting.

The listed values total approximately 11.67 BNOK across 16 agreements and are highly concentrated: gas distribution (60.9%) and hybrid power (30%) together account for roughly 91% of the portfolio. The remaining lines constitute a comparatively small share, with renewables combined at approximately 4%. Several agreements extend through 2027, indicating a portfolio oriented toward medium-term commitments. Reflecting the intended scale and strategic direction of support, the figures point to a forward-looking investment profile that is still taking shape and offering a timely opportunity to assess how interventions are likely to perform and reinforce one another over time. While the table below includes activities starting in 2020, the scope of the evaluation will be limited to the start of the Nansen Program.

Table 1. Norway Energy-Sector Disbursements to Ukraine by Subsector (2020 – 2025)³²

<i>Norway Energy Disbursements 2020 - 2025</i>	<i>Million NOK</i>
Energy policy	559.50
Energy policy and administrative management	489.50
Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency	70
Energy generation, renewable sources	99.18
Energy generation, renewable sources – multiple technologies	57.63
Hydro-electric power plants	5.42
Solar energy for centralized grids	0.89
Wind energy	35.24
Energy generation, non-renewable sources	400
Natural gas-fired electric power plants	400
Hybrid energy electric power plants	2918.50
Hybrid energy electric power plants	2918.50
Nuclear energy electric power plants	690.25


³¹ World Bank Group. (2026). *Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF)*. Available from: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/urtrf>. Accessed 11 June 2026.

³² Norad. (2026). *Microdata*. Available from: <https://resultater.norad.no/microdata>. Accessed 12 June 2026.

Nuclear energy electric power plants and nuclear safety	690.25
Heating, cooling and energy distribution	7200
Electric power transmission and distribution (centralized grids)	1065
Retail gas distribution	6135
Grand Total	11867.43

The dynamic of the composition of energy generation from 2013 to 2021 to 2025 (approximate figures for the latter) is presented in the graphs below. Precise estimates of the generation mix at present are more difficult to measure due to infrastructure damage, fluctuating generation capacity, and increased reliance on imports and other emergency measures.

Composition of Energy Generation in Ukraine from 2013 to 2025³³



Note: 2025 values are best-available estimates based on partial public reporting; exact annual source-by-source shares were not published in a single official table.

Ukraine's electricity mix changed significantly between 2013 and 2021. In 2013, generation was dominated by nuclear power and coal. 2021 witnessed a marked decline in coal, while nuclear became the system anchor and renewables emerged gradually. Although they expanded from negligible levels, renewables remained a relatively small share of total generation. By 2025, the mix reflected both a system shaped by large-scale disruption and longer-term structural change. Nuclear remains the backbone of energy generation, but its share has moderated slightly under shifting operating conditions. Renewables have continued to expand, supported in part by decentralized and distributed generation. The price of solar and wind energy is now \$0.09 per kWh compared with \$0.11 for coal³⁴. At the same time, gas has taken on a more prominent role in balancing the system and addressing short-term supply needs. Coal's contribution has declined further, reflecting both structural transition and the destruction, occupation, flooding or loss of thermal generation assets. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had 135 active mines (more than 90% located in Donetsk and Luhansk regions), producing over 80 million tons per year³⁵.

³³ Interfax Ukraine. (2014). *Ukraine posts 2.3% fall in electricity generation in 2013*. Available from: <https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/186755.html>. Accessed 18 May 2026.

Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy. (2021). *Ukraine's RES 2021*. Available from: <https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/ukraines-res-2021/250777725?nway=#1>. Accessed 18 May 2026.

Enerdata. (2023). *Ukraine's government approves the Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2050*. Available from: <https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/ukraines-government-approves-energy-strategy-ukraine-until-2050.html>. Accessed 18 May 2026.

Expro Consulting. (2025). *The share of RES in the structure of electricity generation in March 2025 was almost 9%*. Available from: <https://expro.com.ua/en/tidings/the-share-of-res-in-the-structure-of-electricity-generation-in-march-2025-was-almost-9>. Accessed 18 May 2026.

EcoPolitic. (2026). *In Ukraine, green energy accounted for 11% of total electricity generation in 2025 – NEURC*. Available from: <https://ecopolitic.com.ua/en/news/in-ukraine-green-energy-accounted-for-11-of-total-electricity-generation-in-2025-neurc/>. Accessed 18 May 2026.

³⁴ PVknowhow. *Ukraine Solar Report*. Available from: <https://www.pvknowhow.com/solar-report/ukraine/>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

³⁵ Center for Eastern Studies. (2014). *A growing deficit of coal in Ukraine*. Analyses. Available from: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-10-22/a-growing-deficit-coal-ukraine>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

By February 2022, only 49 mines remained under government control, and by 2025 this had fallen to around 40 mines, of which only about 30 were still extracting coal³⁶. This has resulted in an estimated 70% drop in coal output from pre-war peaks³⁷, contributing to a faster shift towards decentralized renewables and aligning with existing plans to phase out coal by 2035³⁸.

³⁶ Ukrainian State Labor Service statistics quoted in Rubrika. *Giving mines a new life: how coal communities in Ukraine can step onto the path of renewable energy*. Available from: <https://rubryka.com/en/article/rekultyvatsiya-shaht/>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

³⁷ GMK Center. (2025). *Due to the war in Ukraine has lost 74% of its coking coal production*. Available from: <https://gmk.center/en/infographic/due-to-the-war-ukraine-has-lost-74-of-coking-coal-production/>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

Independent Statistics and Analysis. U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2025). *Country Analysis Brief: Ukraine*. Available from: https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/countries_short/Ukraine/Ukraine.pdf. Accessed 27 April 2026.

³⁸ S&P Global. (2021). *COP26: Ukraine aims for 2035 coal phase-out as more European nations join alliance*. Available from: <https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/110421-cop26-ukraine-aims-for-2035-coal-phaseout-as-more-european-nations-join-alliance>. Accessed 27 April 2026.

Ukraine's National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) until 2030 and the National Energy and Climate Plan to 2030³⁹ target at least 27% renewables in gross final energy consumption and 12.2 GW of installed solar by 2030⁴⁰, while technical potential above 80 GW suggests substantial scaling capacity. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had more than 8 GW of installed solar capacity⁴¹. From this disrupted baseline, the market added about 800 MW of new capacity in 2024⁴² and 1.5 GW in 2025⁴³, supported by a growing pipeline of municipal and private projects. In 2025, 86.4% of Ukraine's 2,427 renewable energy producers were solar plants⁴⁴. Deployment is supported by simplified permitting, stronger local energy planning, municipal incentives, and major financing commitments, including €9.3 billion in EU-backed guarantees and €600 million in EBRD support. Falling technology costs have also strengthened the economics of expansion: solar panel import prices decreased from USD 115,000 per ton in 2010 to USD 4,000 in 2024⁴⁵. New projects are increasingly paired with battery energy storage, supporting more decentralized and resilient power solutions. In the wind sector, 324 MW of new capacity was added in 2025, up from around 20 MW in 2024, with a further 500–600 MW reportedly planned for 2026⁴⁶. The NREAP targets around 6.1 GW of wind by 2030⁴⁷, including flagship projects such as the Tyligulska Wind Farm in Mykolaiv (500 MW)⁴⁸. Hydropower, by contrast, faces slower recovery following the loss of Kakhovka Dam and its associated Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP), where restoration of groundwater and microclimate is expected to take at least 30 years⁴⁹. Large hydropower is furthermore associated with major rivers and contested environmental impacts⁵⁰, while smaller hydropower potential is concentrated largely in western Ukraine, including in natural reserve areas in the Carpathians⁵¹. The 2030 NREAP target for hydropower is 4.7 GW, including 4.5 GW for large plants and 234 MW for small plants⁵². The timeline outlines destroyed hydropower

³⁹ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. (2024). *National Energy and Climate Plan to 2030*. Available from:

<https://me.gov.ua/download/2cad4803-661e-4ae9-9748-3006d6eb3e1c/file.pdf>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴⁰ DLF. (n.d.). *National Renewable Energy Action Plan*. Available from: https://dlf.ua/wp-content/uploads/pdf/14026/14026_p.pdf. Accessed 28 April 2026.

Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. *Energy Strategy*. Available from: <https://mev.gov.ua/en/reforma/energy-strategy>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

Sustainable Agribusiness Forum. (2024). *Goals for Bioenergy Development: National Renewable Energy Action Plan until 2030*. Available from: <https://saf.org.ua/en/news/2030/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴¹ Ukraine - Germany Energy Partnership. (2025). *Ukraine's 2025 Solar Market Outlook*. Available from: <https://energypartnership-ukraine.org/milestones/default-title/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ pv magazine. (2026). *Ukraine deploys 1.5 GW of solar in 2025*. Available from: <https://www.pv-magazine.com/2026/01/26/ukraine-deploys-1-5-gw-of-solar-in-2025/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴⁴ BDO in Ukraine. 2025. *Report: Renewable energy in Ukraine: production, investments, and prospects*. Available from: https://media-eur.gwt.bdo.global/cmslibrary/Ukraine/media/bdo/Insight%20promos/Insights/New%20from%20Agust%202023/Renewable-energy-in-Ukraine_eng.pdf. Accessed 29 April 2026.

⁴⁵ See BDO.

⁴⁶ EcoPolitic. (2026). *Up to 600 MW of new wind farm capacity will be added in Ukraine over the course of the year*. Available from: <https://ecopolitic.com.ua/en/news/up-to-600-mw-of-new-wind-farm-capacity-will-be-added-in-ukraine-over-the-course-of-the-year/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴⁷ Ukrainian Wind Energy Association. (2024). *Ukraine's government sets target for 6.1 GW of wind power by 2030 and announces pilot res auction dates*. Available from: <https://uwea.com.ua/en/news/entry/uryad-ukrani-vstanoviv-cl-z-dosyagnennya-61-gvt-vtroenergetichno-potuzhnost/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴⁸ DTEK. (n.d.) *Tyligulska Wind Farm*. Available from: <https://renewables.dtek.com/en/tyligulska/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

The Windpower - Wind energy database. (2026). *Tiligulska (Ukraine)*. Available from: https://www.thewindpower.net/windfarm_en_39941_tiligulska.php. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁴⁹ UNDP. (2026). *Flooding was 'just the beginning': Kakhovka dam disaster, two years on*. Available from: <https://ukraine.un.org/en/295829-flooding-was-%E2%80%98just-the-beginning%E2%80%99-kakhovka-dam-disaster-two-years>. Accessed 28 April 2026.


Center for Economy Strategy. (2024). *Economic Consequences of the Dam Destruction at the Kakhovka HPP*. Available from: <https://ces.org.ua/en/economic-consequences-kakhovkahps-destruction/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

⁵⁰ UNDP representative. Reference Group Interview. 22 May 2026.

⁵¹ EcoPolitic. (2025). *Small hydropower plants in the Carpathians: what is the current situation and why activists are against it*. Available from: <https://ecopolitic.com.ua/en/news/construction-of-small-hydropower-plants-in-the-carpathians-what-is-the-current-situation-and-why-activists-are-against-it/>. Accessed 22 May 2026.

⁵² Ukraine Wind Energy Agency. (2024). *Ukraine's government sets target for 6.1 GW of wind power by 2030 and announces pilot res auction dates*. Available from: <https://uwea.com.ua/en/news/entry/uryad-ukrani-vstanoviv-cl-z-dosyagnennya-61-gvt-vtroenergetichno-potuzhnost/>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

infrastructure and restored thermal and hydropower restored capacity from 2023 to January



Context of the Evaluation: Energy Needs and Support in Moldova

Facing similar challenges to Ukraine, Moldova's accelerated deployment of renewable energy within a hybrid system integrating imports, storage, and residual fossil capacity⁵⁴ offers a useful parallel for examining how energy interventions contribute to energy security and system resilience under acute stress. This is particularly relevant as Moldova's path to European Union (EU) accession depends in part on scaling up clean energy investment, including renewable energy, storage capacity, and energy efficiency, while addressing workforce and infrastructure gaps⁵⁵. Moldova remains structurally dependent on imported gas and lacks electricity self-sufficiency. Until 2021, its gas infrastructure was only connected to Ukraine. After Gazprom cut daily gas delivery by about 60% in October 2022, Moldova accelerated reforms in the energy section. The situation intensified after the Russian gas transit contract through Ukraine expired in early 2025.⁵⁶ As Russian gas transit through Ukraine ceased, the Transnistrian plant stopped supplying electricity to right-bank Moldova, forcing emergency imports from Romania and contributing to a roughly 75% increase in electricity tariffs⁵⁷. 371,000 people in Transnistria were left without gas supply for the winter. With almost no baseload generation capacity for year-round operation, reliance on imports from Romania and Ukraine and on the Ukrainian grid for balancing services, Moldova's energy security remains tightly linked to external supply conditions⁵⁸. Despite efforts to diversify gas and electricity sources⁵⁹, its dependence and limited pipeline capacity

⁵³ The timeline was reconstructed based on the following sources:

Harmash, O. (2024). *How Ukraine is keeping the lights on under Russian fire*. Reuters. Available from: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-ukraine-is-keeping-lights-under-russian-fire-2024-05-08/>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

Prengaman, R. (2024). *Ukraine has seen success in building clean energy, which is harder for Russia to destroy*. Washington Times. Available from: <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/nov/20/clean-energy-infrastructure-ukraine-harder-russia-/>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

European Parliament. (2025). *Ukraine's energy infrastructure in crisis as winter approaches*. Parliamentary question. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004463_EN.html. Accessed 20 May 2026.

DTEK. (2025). *DTEK restores 1,441 energy facilities in the first half of 2025*. Available from: <https://dtek.com/en/media-center/news/dtek-restores-1441-energy-facilities-in-first-half-of-2025-/>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

Green Deal Ukraina. (2025). *February 2025: Three years of full-scale invasion*. Available from: <https://greendealukraina.org/assets/images/reports/february-2025-three-years-of-full-scale-invasion.pdf>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

Ukrhydroenergy. (2026). *Projects*. Available from: <https://en.uhe.gov.ua/projects>. Accessed 28 April 2026.

Power Technology. (2024). *Power plant profile: Dnister PSPP, Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.power-technology.com/marketdata/power-plant-profile-dnister-pspp-ukraine/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

Power Technology. (2024). *Power plant profile: Kaniv PSP, Ukraine*. Available from: <https://www.power-technology.com/marketdata/power-plant-profile-kaniv-psp-ukraine/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

Pv-magazine. (2026). *Ukraine deploys 1.5 GW of solar in 2025*. Available from: <https://www.pv-magazine.com/2026/01/26/ukraine-deploys-1-5-gw-of-solar-in-2025/>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

Energy Partnership Ukraine – Germany. (2025). *Ukraine's 2025 Wind Market Outlook*. Available from: <https://energypartnership-ukraine.org/milestones/default-title-1/>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

⁵⁴ Druckman, M. (2025). *Perspective: Moldova as a Clean-Energy Partner for Ukraine's Recovery*. Available from: <https://www.moldovamatters.md/p/moldova-as-a-clean-energy-partner>. Accessed 5 May 2026.

⁵⁵ Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). *Moldova's choice for Europe must now be matched by green reforms*. Available from: <https://www.sei.org/perspectives/moldova-eu-green-reforms/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). *New national assessment shows progress on Moldova's green transition*. Available from: <https://www.sei.org/features/national-assessment-moldova-green-transition/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁵⁶ Negara, Z. (2025). *How can Moldova use the energy crisis to reintegrate the country?* The Hague Research Institute. Available from: <https://hagueresearch.org/how-can-moldova-use-the-energy-crisis-to-reintegrate-the-country/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁵⁷ Togt, N. (2025). *Between Hybrid Warfare and European Aspirations: Moldova's Energy Challenge*. Available from: <https://hagueresearch.org/between-hybrid-warfare-and-european-aspirations-moldovas-energy-challenge/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.


⁵⁸ U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration. (2026). *Moldova Country Commercial Guide. Energy*. Available from: <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/moldova-energy>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁵⁹ OECD. (2026). *Creating well-functioning energy markets in the Republic of Moldova*. OECD Global Relations Policy Papers. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2026/03/creating-well-functioning-energy-markets-in-the-republic-of-moldova_081bb2c8/a02e31fe-en.pdf. Accessed 19 May 2026.

continue to generate wider system vulnerability, fiscal pressure, and exposure to geopolitical coercion.

Between 2022 and 2025, Norway allocated NOK 2.1 billion to Moldova, with support concentrated in the energy sector and humanitarian aid, each accounting for around one third of total allocations. A further one fifth was directed to governance and reforms, while the remainder covered education and civil society⁶⁰.

Energy represented **36%** of the Nansen Program allocations for Moldova in 2022 - 2025.



In 2025, energy, climate, and environment represented Norway's largest support portfolio in Moldova, totaling NOK 194.2 million⁶¹. Norway supports Moldova's green energy transition through a mix of energy-efficiency⁶², renewable energy⁶³, and community-based climate initiatives. This includes support through GIZ to improve energy efficiency, EBRD-backed credit lines with Moldovan banks to expand household access to energy-efficiency financing, contributions to the multi-donor Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (E5P)⁶⁴ and joint support with Sweden and UNDP for community-level climate preparedness, climate-smart solutions for women-led small businesses, and the establishment of Moldova's first renewable energy communities.⁶⁵

2. Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide the Norwegian government and its partners with independent evaluative evidence of the energy sector portfolio as a way of understanding the broader civilian component of the Nansen Support Program. Given the significant share of the total Norwegian funding to Ukraine and Moldova under the Program, evaluating the energy component will also illustrate aspects relevant to a substantial part of the broader civilian portfolio, with applicable cross-sectoral lessons. The evaluation will generate actionable insights to inform strategic decisions as the program transitions from emergency response toward reconstruction and longer-term recovery, pending completion of the active military stage. The evaluation will further test the underlying Theory of Change of the Nansen Program, assessing the extent to which its assumed causal mechanisms are supported by evidence across different contexts and modalities.

Grounded in the perspectives of actors closest to implementation, the evaluation will generate learning on how energy-sector interventions under the civilian component of the Nansen Program

⁶⁰ Norad. (2026). *Moldova in the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine*. Available from:

<https://www.norad.no/en/insight2/tematiske-omrader/the-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine/moldova-in-the-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁶¹ Royal Norwegian Embassy Office in Chisinau. Norway in Moldova. (2026). *Development Cooperation between Norway and Moldova*. Available from: <https://www.norway.no/en/moldova/norway-moldova/development-cooperation-between-norway-and-moldova/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁶² Government of Norway. (2026). *Allocation of funding under the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine in 2026*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/allocation-of-funding-under-the-nansen-support-programme-for-ukraine-in-2026/id3145799/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

Government of Norway. (2024) *Strengthening the energy bonds between Moldova and Norway*. Available from: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/strengthening-the-energy-bonds-between-moldova-and-norway/id3037650/>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁶³ GIZ. (2023). *Promoting energy efficiency and renewable energies in Moldova*. Available from:

<https://www.giz.de/en/projects/energy-efficiency-and-renewable-energies-moldova>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁶⁴ E5P. (n.d.). *Homepage*. Available from: <https://e5p.eu/moldova>. Accessed 19 May 2026.

⁶⁵ See reference 51, Norad. (2026). *Moldova in the Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine*.

achieve results amid uncertainty. The evaluation aims to identify governance and delivery constraints and enablers that shape performance from an outward-looking perspective that prioritizes operational realities and system effects. In doing so, it further strengthens the evidence base on aid effectiveness in conflict settings. The evaluation objectives focus on contribution pathways and on the adaptive capacity of governance and delivery arrangements. At the same time, the evaluation should recognize that success in a wartime context cannot be judged against business-as-usual standards. It should distinguish between longer-term contributions to resilience and system transformation, and shorter-term interventions that keep essential services functioning, sustain operations, and preserve economic activity under acute stress. These near-term effects are also central to supporting the country, as continued economic activity helps protect jobs and livelihoods.

The specific objectives are to:

- Assess the extent to which Norwegian energy sector interventions under the Nansen Support Program have contributed to immediate energy security, service continuity, and longer-term system-wide energy resilience in Ukraine and Moldova, in line with the Program’s strategic framework and Theory of Change;
- Through selected case studies, examine how different energy financing and delivery arrangements have contributed to essential service continuity, operational stability, private-sector activity, and economic resilience under acute stress, while also supporting longer-term resilience and system transformation.
- Examine variation in outcomes, speed of deployment, corruption risks, and trade-offs across modalities, delivery arrangements, operational contexts, geographies, and time horizons.
- Assess the extent to which Norwegian energy-sector support is aligned with evolving Ukrainian and Moldovan needs, institutionally anchored in partner systems, and complementary to the wider international response, including where Norway is comparatively well-placed to contribute.
- Identify lessons from selected cases on which support models and delivery approaches appear most promising for maintaining critical functions during crisis, strengthening adaptive capacity, and supporting energy resilience over time.
- Through selected case studies, examine how different energy financing and delivery arrangements have contributed to service continuity, private-sector activity, and economic resilience over varying time horizons.
- Identify lessons from selected cases on which support models and delivery approaches appear most promising for strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity over different time horizons.
- Formulate evidence-based, actionable recommendations for Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on energy-sector support.

3. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation examines how civilian support has contributed to resilience outcomes⁶⁶ (sustainable growth, lives saved, and statal financial stability) in Ukraine and, where directly relevant, Moldova, assessing these outcomes in relation to the Nansen Program’s Theory of Change and its underlying causal assumptions. Moldova is included where Norwegian civilian support or Ukraine-related energy system effects generate direct, material spillovers⁶⁷ relevant to

⁶⁶ OECD. (2026). *Lessons from evaluation on effective support to Ukraine*. Available from OECD One Digital Library. Accessed 24 March 2026.

⁶⁷ Info Sud-Est. (2026, March 23). *Linia electrică Isaccea–Vulcănești a fost deconectată din cauza atacurilor rusești din Ucraina*. Maia Sandu: „Rusia este singura responsabilă pentru întreruperea principalei legături energetice a Moldovei cu Europa”. Available

learning on the Nansen Program. The evaluation aims to assess progress toward intended⁶⁸ and unintended outcomes and impacts and examines how observed changes can be plausibly linked to the program.

It examines the modalities, instruments and partnerships through which energy sector support has sought to enhance energy resilience and security; the mechanisms administered by the MFA and Norad to sustain operations, foster employment and stimulate economic activity; and the extent to which governance structures, decision-making, and coordination arrangements have enabled timely, context-responsive adaptation in practice, as evidenced through the experiences of implementation partners and other actors closest to delivery.

The evaluation will draw systematically on the perspectives of actors closest to implementation, using their accounts to support agile sense-making and the co-construction of insights between the evaluators and the actors in Ukraine. At the same time, the evaluation team should consider each actor's role, institutional position, and reasons for emphasizing specific issues. It will assess how decisions are made and adjusted in practice across institutional interfaces, and how these processes support or constrain timely, context-responsive adaptation as conditions evolve.

Where relevant, the evaluation will also reference cross-cutting issues⁶⁹, specifically in relation to environmental sustainability and maintaining anti-corruption in scope. Analysis will examine how these priorities are operationalized in practice, the trade-offs and tensions encountered in delivery, and the extent to which existing systems and processes enable or constrain their effective, coherent application. Findings will inform recommendations on how to embed these dimensions more systematically as mutually reinforcing elements of impact.

The evaluation will reinforce inter-institutional coordination among international actors to avoid duplication. In this respect, the evaluation should consider ongoing work by EBRD's Independent Evaluation Department (IEvD) assessing the results of the Bank's engagement in Ukraine (2022–2025). IEvD's evaluation places energy security as a core area of enquiry, with findings expected in Q1 2027.⁷⁰

4. Audience of the Evaluation

The evaluation will be utilization focused. The primary audience comprises key stakeholders involved in the governance, implementation, oversight, and strategic development of Norway's civilian support to Ukraine under the Nansen Support Program.

This includes:

- **Norad's Nansen Department:** Norad's Nansen Department is the primary user of the evaluation. The Department could use findings and recommendations to strengthen strategic learning, adaptive management, and coherence across a complex and rapidly evolving portfolio.
- **The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA):** As the lead body responsible for political and strategic direction of the Nansen Program, the MFA will have access to evidence to inform

from:

<https://www.info-sud-est.ro/linia-electrica-isaccea-vulcanesti-a-fost-deconectata-din-cauza-atacurilor-rusesti-din-ucraina-maia-sandu-rusia-este-singura-responsabila-pentru-intreruperea-principalei-legaturi-energetice-a-moldovei-cu-europa/>. Accessed 24 March 2026.

⁶⁸ As per the Theory of Change developed by Norad's Nansen Team.

⁶⁹ As defined by the Nansen Program.

⁷⁰ EBRD Independent Evaluation Department. (2024). *IEvD Work Programme 2025 – 2027*. Available from: <https://www.ebrd.com/home/who-we-are/strategies-governance-compliance/evaluation.html#customtab-bc3746ea4e-item-9fee9f0853-tab>. Accessed 20 May 2026.

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high-level policy choices, coordination with international partners and alignment with Ukraine's evolving needs and geopolitical context.

- **Norwegian Embassy in Kyiv and Embassy Office in Chisinau:** Given their operational roles in Ukraine and Moldova, the embassies may use evaluation findings to support context-specific engagement, partner dialogue, and on-the-ground coordination.

The evaluation will also be expected to inform the work of organizations and communities in Ukraine. While these actors are not primary users, as an audience, they could consider whether their perspectives and experiences have been adequately incorporated in the evaluation.

- **Government agencies in Ukraine and Moldova** involved in humanitarian response and assistance, recovery coordination, and planning, especially the Ministry of Energy in Ukraine and the Ministry of Energy in Moldova;
- **Operational partners** (e.g., multilateral organizations, IFIs, private sector, Norwegian and Ukrainian NGOs);
- **Ukrainian and Moldovan civil society actors** engaged in reconstruction, humanitarian response or active in environmental protection.

Additional audiences for whom the evaluation findings may be of interest include:

- **The Norwegian Ministry of Energy:** The Ministry plays a central role in ensuring coherence across Norway's policy frameworks that inform implementation mechanisms and global partnerships. The evaluation will produce learning that can help bridge domestic and international policy agendas and reinforce strategic alignment, particularly in relation to energy security, resilience, and long-term transition pathways.
- **The Norwegian Parliament (Storting):** As the ultimate overseer of Norway's foreign aid allocations, the Parliament is a key, although not the principal, recipient of the evaluation's learning function.
- **Development agencies and peers** (e.g., OECD/DAC members) interested in Nansen Program evaluative findings and impact evaluations in fragile and conflict settings;
- **Researchers and policy advisors** studying aid effectiveness in conflict and high-risk environments.

5. Evaluation Questions

Question 1. Contribution to energy resilience and security

1.1. To what extent and how have Norwegian energy sector interventions under the Nansen Support Program contributed to immediate energy security, continuity of essential services, and longer-term system-wide energy resilience and security in Ukraine and Moldova? To what extent, and through which pathways, have Norwegian energy sector interventions under the Nansen Support Program contributed to immediate energy security, continuity of essential services, and longer-term system-wide energy resilience and security in Ukraine and Moldova? (Effectiveness)

1.2. What intended, spillover, or unintended effects have emerged for broader service delivery, operational continuity, economic activity, and social resilience? How do these effects differ across operational time horizons? (Impact, Sustainability)

Question 2. Performance and strategic tradeoffs

2.1. How have outcomes varied across energy modalities, partner arrangements, operational contexts, geographies, and time horizons? What factors explain these variations? (Impact)

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2.2. How have anti-corruption instruments and measures as well as risk management affected the speed, flexibility, and effectiveness at implementing partner level, and what are the inherent trade-offs? (Impact, Efficiency, Effectiveness)

2.3. Under what conditions do different financing and delivery approaches, including blended finance, offer the strongest balance between cost, risk, environmental sustainability, and longer-term contribution to resilience outcomes? (Efficiency)

2.3. Under what conditions do different financing and delivery approaches, including blended finance, offer the strongest balance between cost, risk, environmental sustainability, and contribution to resilience outcomes? (Efficiency)

Question 3. Strategic alignment and sustainability of energy interventions

3.1. To what extent do Norwegian energy interventions reflect evolving Ukrainian and Moldovan energy-sector needs, priorities, and planning processes in Ukraine and Moldova, across generation, distribution, and transmission? How effectively are these considerations translated into Norwegian decision-making by the MFA and Norad? (Coherence)

3.2. To what extent are Norwegian-supported interventions institutionally anchored in Ukrainian and Moldovan systems and partner arrangements in ways that both sustain critical functions during crisis and strengthen ownership, coordination, and the prospects for sustained results over time? (Coherence, Sustainability)

6. Methodology

Evaluation Design

The approach should be conflict-sensitive and designed to generate credible, decision-relevant findings under conditions of uncertainty. The evaluation shall employ a mixed-methods contribution analysis design structured around two research streams:

1. The explanatory analysis will assess how activities and outputs plausibly link to observed outcome- and impact-level changes in energy security. Operativity will be combined⁷¹ to test contribution pathways, explore alternative explanations, and capture intended and unintended effects in a high-uncertainty operating environment. The analysis should factor in that potentially even the most relevant effects of the Program might not be fully visible through standard reporting frameworks.
2. To deepen causal understanding, the evaluation shall include a comparative analysis of up to four cases that test how and under what conditions selected interventions have contributed to observed results. Case selection should be purposeful and reflect variation across energy-sector modalities, delivery arrangements, and operating contexts in ways which allow for testing and refining the overall Theory of Change for the evaluation. For each case, the evaluation should develop a specific Theory of Change by combining program logic with field-level realities and local perspectives, and draw on complementary evidence sources to assess contribution, surface enabling and constraining conditions, and identify implications for scalability and durability. Cross-case synthesis should consolidate lessons on mechanisms, trade-offs, and contextual factors shaping outcomes and impact over time.

Case studies

⁷¹ Greene JC, Valerie J, Caracelli, Graham WF. (1989). *Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs*. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis. 1989;11:255–274. doi: 10.3102/01623737011003255. Available from: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1163620>. Accessed 15 May 2026.

Energy-sector support constitutes the primary analytical entry point for this evaluation, serving as a lens through which the evaluation explores wider contribution pathways⁷² to service continuity, private-sector activity, and economic resilience. Within this frame, the evaluation traces how interactions among different instruments, partners, and modalities have generated outcomes over time. These dimensions are to be examined in greater depth through analytical focus areas and case studies. The latter will serve to test and refine the evaluation contribution pathways and inform actionable recommendations on what works, for whom, and under what circumstances.

Case study selection should be guided by explicit comparison benchmarks. Bidders should justify each proposed case against a limited number of criteria, including intervention modality, delivery arrangement, operating context, energy-system function, outcome pathway, scale, maturity, and data availability. The selected cases should allow the evaluation to compare how different forms of energy-sector support contribute to resilience, energy security, service continuity, and economic activity under varying conditions.

Case studies could be focused to compare: private and public sector; emergency energy support and longer-term green transition investments; decentralized renewable solutions and gas-based balancing capacity; geography consisting of front-line regions and “safe regions”; companies (such as Naftogaz) or clusters; SME support via intermediaries; different IFIs (EBRD, World Bank and NECFO); stand-alone grants, grants to IFIs, and different forms of blended finance, in addition other forms of grants if applicable. The evaluation team should propose a case selection matrix demonstrating how each case contributes to one or more purposeful comparisons.

Bids might include additional focus areas and case studies.

Data sources

At a minimum, the evaluation should draw on a synthesized evidence base comprising:

- relevant program and partner documentation;
- statistical and administrative sources, including reference to data and reports by international organizations including the International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the European Commission (EC) in the energy domain;
- direct inquiry and fieldwork including face-to-face interviews and sense-making discussions with actors closest to implementation and to outcomes, as well as with relevant institutional and non-institutional stakeholders throughout Ukraine and (where relevant) Moldova. Given that Program actors are often engaged in emergency response following intensified attacks during the winter months, it is strongly recommended that fieldwork be scheduled outside this period.

Bidders must demonstrate an understanding of the constraints on data and evidence in war-time Ukraine in the contexts of martial law and restricted information disclosure and propose appropriate alternative data sources to mitigate access limitations.

Confidentiality of sensitive information

A portion of energy-related work entails operating with sensitive information on energy infrastructure in war-time Ukraine. In line with EVAL’s confidentiality agreement, the evaluation

⁷² Mayne, J. (2012). *Contribution analysis: Coming of age?* *Evaluation*.18(3), 270–280. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254091562_Contribution_Analysis_Coming_of_Age. Accessed 24 March 2026. **INTERNAL USE**

team must maintain all sensitive information confidential, always refraining from the disclosure of sensitive data.

Use of automated processes

Automated processes, including AI, may be used for document review and data analysis to improve efficiency and generate insights; any such use should be described transparently, including limitations, quality assurance, and measures to protect privacy and security of respondents, data providers, and beneficiaries.

Considering the restrictions related to data sensitivity, the evaluation team must clearly specify which AI tools will be used to what extent and purpose. It must equally specify what categories of information are to be excluded from AI processes, and the means through which sensitive materials will be protected. The evaluation team should further quality-assure draft deliverables thoroughly to avoid disseminating sensitive information.

General requirements

The evaluation's recommendations will follow a decision-focused logic, prioritizing actionable insights that link future scale-up and resource allocation to demonstrated impact over time⁷³. Findings will be framed to remain "evergreen," practical, and feasible, responsive to delivery realities including changing programmatic circumstances and operational needs. Concise and decision-relevant insights and recommendations will be accessible and tailored to different audiences.

The evaluation will follow recognized evaluation principles: OECD/DAC quality standards for development evaluation⁷⁴, standards mentioned in *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results*⁷⁵, trauma-informed research⁷⁶, Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (PSEAH) Guidelines and safeguarding procedures, and conflict sensitivity. The evaluation team will engage with Gender, Ethical, Legal, Societal Aspects (GELSA) and Cultural Competency across all phases of the evaluation process. The evaluation will develop strategies to mitigate direct and indirect negative effects of the evaluation process and outcomes, outlined in the Inception Report.

The evaluation team may suggest alternative approaches and methods that meet the objectives of this Terms of Reference with comparable rigor and ability to answer the evaluation questions.

7. Organization of the Evaluation

The Independent Evaluation Department of Norwegian Development Cooperation (EVAL) is responsible for contracting the evaluation team and for quality assurance and oversight

⁷³ Shah, NB, Wang, P, Fraker, A and Gastfriend, D. 2015. *Evaluations with impact: decision-focused impact evaluation as a practical policymaking tool*. 3ie Working Paper 25. New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). Available from: www.3ieimpact.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/wp25-evaluations_with_impact.pdf. Accessed: 19 March 2026.

⁷⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2010). *DAC quality standards for development evaluation*. OECD Publishing. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/dac-quality-standards-for-development-evaluation_9789264083905-en.html. Accessed 24 March 2026.

⁷⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2012). *Evaluating donor engagement in situations of conflict and fragility*. OECD Publishing. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/evaluating-donor-engagement-in-situations-of-conflict-and-fragility_9789264106802-en.html. Accessed 24 March 2026.

⁷⁶ Australian Institute of Family Studies. (2025). *Principles for doing trauma-informed research and program evaluation*. Available from: <https://aifs.gov.au/resources/practice-guides/principles-doing-trauma-informed-research-and-program-evaluation>. Accessed 7 March 2025.

throughout the evaluation process. All decisions concerning the interpretation of these Terms of Reference and all deliverables are subject to EVAL's approval. Throughout the evaluation, EVAL retains exclusive authority over the interpretation of the Terms of Reference and the approval of all deliverables, ensuring that the evaluation remains focused on producing actionable, decision-relevant outcomes.

EVAL has appointed an **Advisory Group** to safeguard quality and independence. The Advisory Group may review the inception report, interim drafts, and final deliverables, advise on risk mitigation, and provide guidance on ethical and evaluability concerns.

The **contracted evaluation team** is responsible for implementing the evaluation and will appoint a Project Leader who serves as the primary liaison with EVAL. The Project Leader will be accountable for delivering all outputs and providing bimonthly progress updates, including any proposed adjustments to the design and any risks to timely completion. The evaluation team will consolidate stakeholder inputs and incorporate relevant feedback into deliverables, while ensuring that substantive disagreements are transparently reflected in final products where material. If required, a deputy Project Leader will also be assigned by the contractor to initiate and respond to information flows.

In addition to the Advisory Group, EVAL will establish and convene a **Stakeholder Reference Group**. Consisting of key implementation partners, representatives of Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities, and peer donors, the Reference Group will provide input at key stages of the evaluation to strengthen credibility, usefulness, and actionability of findings and recommendations. This group will contribute through sense-making workshops and feedback on emerging findings to offer contextual knowledge that strengthens the evaluation's analytical credibility and practical relevance. Additionally, thematic or evaluation experts may provide input throughout the evaluation process outside the scope of the Reference Group.

The evaluation team must maintain high standards of integrity and transparency. The bid must include risk management (with mitigation strategies), potential evaluability and ethical issues, and quality assurance arrangements. These will be specified in the inception report and reviewed whenever needed. All data collection tools will be submitted to EVAL for approval as annexes to the Inception Report. Changing circumstances may require that new tools are developed or that existing ones are altered. In such cases, the evaluation team should submit new or altered tools to EVAL for approval.

EVAL and stakeholders will provide access to archives and data in formats that support efficient retrieval and use of documents. Relevant government documentation will mostly be exclusively available in Norwegian as well as in Ukrainian or Romanian.

Additional References

Goodrick, D. (2014). *Comparative Case Studies, Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 9*. UNICEF Office of Research, Florence. Available from: https://www.betterevaluation.org/sites/default/files/Comparative_Case_Studies_ENG.pdf. Accessed 13 May 2026.

Keudel, O. (2026). *Societal Resilience and Local Governance in Ukraine amid the Russian Full-scale Invasion*. Seminar presented at OsloMet/UKRAINETT, Oslo, 28 January.

Mayne, J. (2015). *Useful theory of change models*. Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. 30(2), 119–142. Available from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279533296_Useful_Theory_of_Change_Models. Accessed 24 March 2026.

Norad. (2024). R2024-03 *Forvaltning av Nansen-programmet: Organisering, risikostyring og informasjonssikkerhet. Internrevisjonsrapport*.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024). *Norway's Humanitarian Strategy 2024–2029*. Available from:

https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/7257c8ae2e1f47e9a44c93844b6a8864/en-gb/pdfs/e-1026-e_norways-humanitarian-strategy.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2025.

NUPI. (2026). *Social trust and resilience: Recent findings from Ukraine*. Seminar presented at Rosenkrantz' gate 22, Oslo, 6 February 2026.

Patton, M.Q. (2015). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory and practice* (4th ed.). London: SAGE Publications.

Pawson, R., & Tilley, N. (1997). *Realistic evaluation*. London: SAGE Publications.

Section 5.1.1 The Consultant's responsibilities and expertise

8. Deliverables

The evaluation will produce a series of interlinked deliverables designed to support accountability, learning, and strategic uptake throughout the evaluation process.

A. Inception Report

The first deliverable will be an **Inception Report**. Its first draft is to be submitted within five weeks of contract signature. The Inception Report will elaborate and operationalize the evaluation design (the combination of approaches, methods, and techniques), demonstrating how it will address each evaluation question with appropriate rigor and deliver within the allotted timeframe. This report, not to exceed thirty pages excluding annexes, will:

- demonstrate the evaluation team's understanding of the Terms of Reference;
- set out a detailed Theory of Change of the energy component, including its potential contribution to wider goals including resilience, humanitarian protection, economic recovery, governance reform, and social cohesion and its potential production of important unintended outcomes identified in previous research;
- provide an evaluation matrix of proposed data sources and analysis methods for each evaluation question;
- map stakeholders;
- describe the methodological approach;
- consider a framework outlining different pathways by which the evaluated response might be scaled and/or sustained;
- propose initial selection of cases, justifying choices following case selection criteria – in some cases, this might involve a second set of cases after the initial ones are completed;
- include tools and protocols for data collection and processing (including any AI-assisted processes);

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- discuss constraints and limitations, also in relation to the independence of the evaluation;
- describe the risk management and ethical strategies, covering trauma-informed research, Do No Harm principles, and conflict sensitivity;
- spell out a comprehensive operational work plan with timelines, milestones, feedback loops, dissemination activities, and proposed formats for knowledge products such as reports, infographics or dashboards.

Approval by EVAL is required before proceeding to subsequent phases and for further selection of cases and additional data collection and processing tools.

B. Interim Report

Approximately three months after approval of the Inception Report, the evaluation team will deliver the first report and convene a one-day sense-making workshop in Oslo or virtually. The workshop will generate a summary note and agreed action points that inform the next stage of the evaluation (see below). The twenty-page (excluding annexes) report will:

- summarize findings on energy sector support;
- include case studies in alignment with the methodology sector and analytical focus suggested;
- identify emerging trends and data gaps;
- propose refinements to the analytical focus;
- provide an analysis of contribution pathways, overall findings, and enabling and constraining conditions for energy security and resilience.

C. Sense-making and Validation Workshops

Throughout the evaluation, two Sense-making and Validation Workshops will be held to ensure stakeholder engagement and iterative learning and to provide opportunities for improved evidence and analysis, especially in relation to unintended outcomes and sustainability. Each workshop will produce a synthesized record of participant feedback, a consolidated comments matrix, and a short note reporting on agreed next steps.

D. Final Report

The Final Evaluation Report will comprise:

- an executive summary of no more than three pages;
- an introduction;
- a context section;
- a detailed methodology chapter;
- findings structured by evaluation question;
- chapters focusing on contribution analyses;
- conclusions;
- decision-focused, actionable recommendations;
- annexes.

This Report should not exceed 40 pages excluding annexes. It will be accompanied by all underlying data (including redacted interview transcripts, coded datasets, analysis logs, metadata documentation, AI tool scripts, and visualization files) in a well-organized digital repository.

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Within four weeks of receiving consolidated feedback, the Final Evaluation Report will be submitted. This version, limited to forty pages excluding the executive summary and annexes, will integrate comments from stakeholders and EVAL, adhere to OECD/DAC and departmental quality standards, and include annexes containing the Terms of Reference, evaluation matrix, detailed methodology, stakeholder lists, case study documentation, and a complete data inventory.

E. Dissemination activities and materials

Together with the final report, a four-page *Policy Brief* tailored to senior decision-makers will distill key findings, strategic insights, and priority recommendations.

Presentation materials will include editable PowerPoint decks for workshops, delivered at least one week before each event to support knowledge sharing and stakeholder uptake.

A final *Utilization Workshop* will be organized in Oslo prior to the delivery of the Final Report. The workshop will present the evaluation's final findings and facilitate strategic uptake by senior decision-makers.

As part of the contract, the evaluation team will conduct *dissemination activities* with stakeholders to maximize take up of recommendations both in Ukraine and in Norway: a minimum of three dissemination activities will be held, tailored to specific audiences.

Bidders can suggest additional activities, including innovative dissemination modes.

F. Follow-up Engagement Report and Webinar

Within six months of the Final Evaluation Report submission, the evaluation team will produce a ten-page Follow-up Engagement Report documenting dissemination activities, stakeholder feedback sessions, early uptake and application of recommendations, barriers to utilization, lessons learned and suggested programmatic adjustments. This report will be accompanied by a brief webinar with Norad and the MFA presenting the key engagement outcomes.

All deliverables will be prepared in English, submitted electronically according to the agreed progress plan, comply with EVAL's formatting and style guidelines, and remain under EVAL's exclusive rights for distribution, publication, and dissemination. The reports will be published digitally.

Table 2. Timeline of Deliverables

<i>Deliverable</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Maximum Length</i>
Inception Report Draft	Five weeks after contract signature	Max. 30 pages
Inception Report	Seven weeks after contract signature	
Interim Report	Three months after approval of the Inception Report	20 pages (excluding annexes)

Sense-making and Validation Workshop 1	Three months after approval of the Inception Report	Max. 10 pages for workshop note 3 - 4 hours
Sense-making and Validation Workshop 2	Four months after approval of the Interim Report	Max. 10 pages for workshop note 3 - 4 hours
Utilization Workshop	Two weeks prior to the delivery of the final report	2 hours
Final Report Draft	At least six weeks prior to the delivery of the final report	Max. 40 pages
Final Report & Policy Brief	Four months after the Interim Report	Max. 40 pages for report Max. 4 pages for brief
Engagement Report	Six months after the Final Evaluation Report submission	Max. 10 pages
Engagement Webinar		2 hours

9. Bid Selection Criteria

A. Technical Quality of the Proposal

This criterion assesses the overall quality and robustness of the proposed approach, including its methodology, context appropriateness and ethics, as well as dissemination and usability of findings.

Assessment will include:

- the clarity, coherence, and overall soundness of the proposed analytical and methodological approach, including its alignment with the scope, objectives, timeframe, and the specific requirements of evaluating the energy sector under the Nansen Program;
- the extent to which the proposed approach is adapted to the operational context, including the feasibility of data collection in a restrictive environment and the adequacy of the proposed ethical safeguards and security considerations;
- the appropriateness and focus of the proposed stakeholder mapping;
- the extent to which the evaluation questions and sub-questions are appropriately prioritized;
- the proposal's capacity to support iterative learning, uptake, and use of findings throughout the evaluation process, including through actionable and forward-looking recommendations;
- the quality, relevance, and usability of the proposed deliverables, including their tailoring to different audiences.

B. Team Competence and Delivery Capacity

This criterion assesses the extent to which the proposed team demonstrates the qualifications, experience, and capacity required to carry out the assignment.

Assessment will include the extent to which the proposed team collectively demonstrates the following qualifications and competencies:

Core evaluation qualifications and experience

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- Proven international experience in conducting country-level and system-level evaluations related to sustainable development;
- Proven experience supporting government institutions in processes of reflection, strategic adaptation, and response to contextual shifts in highly volatile environments;
- Demonstrated expertise in evaluation approaches, methods, and techniques aligned with the methodological requirements set out in the Terms of Reference;
- Demonstrated ability to synthesize diverse evidence, including the integration of convergent and divergent findings;
- Substantial experience conducting fieldwork in high-risk or hostile environments, including the ability to operate with a high degree of autonomy and apply sound risk awareness and mitigation measures.

Additional team competencies

- Excellent written and reading proficiency in English and Ukrainian;
- Demonstrated expertise in the energy sector;
- Experience engaging with a broad range of stakeholders across relevant institutional and operational levels;
- Experience applying relevant and innovative evaluation tools and methods;
- Experience working in Ukraine and the wider Eastern European context;
- Knowledge of Romanian and experience engaging with stakeholders in Moldova will be considered an asset.

The *team leader* (main evaluator) must demonstrate a strong understanding of the range of perspectives required for a comprehensive evaluation in the Ukrainian context. The team leader must be a senior expert with more than 10 years of evaluation experience across development, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and reconstruction, and must have a proven track record of assembling and leading multidisciplinary evaluation teams, demonstrated through at least three relevant assignments.

Section 7.1 Information security

If the Customer imposes further requirements as to how the Consultant is required to manage information security, this shall be specified here.

The Consultant shall specify how information security will be managed in accordance with the relevant requirements outlined in Section 1.1.

Section 7.2.2 Other obligations relating to the processing of personal data

If the Consultant will transfer personal data in such a way as described in Section 7.2.2 of the Agreement, the lawful basis for transfer shall be documented here.